The conceptual question of determining when a deterrence encounter starts and how it ends should first be addressed. To establish whether the attempt at deterrence actually occurred, this study first clarifies the generic meaning of deterrence and corrects for previous ambiguities in distinguishing between general and immediate deterrence. Clarifying this distinction in turn facilitates a more rigorous selection of the cases of immediate deterrence, which are the primary focus of most quantitative literature. This refined definition of deterrence guided the collection of the new data set of extended-immediate deterrence cases for the period from 1895 to 1985, which is presented and compared to previous data sets.
A related conceptual issue concerns deterrence outcomes. This article identifies those aspects of deterrence situations that are logically possible to test in contrast to what was claimed to have been tested in previous studies (i.e., deterrence successes) but failed to meet the logical criteria of testability in the first place. Most studies have considered only two outcomes, success or failure, which are differentiated mainly by the use of force. To consider deterrence outcomes with greater precision, I introduce four outcomes instead-challenger's acquiescence, defender's acquiescence, compromise, and war. Three are peaceful but entail very different politicalimplications for either side. This expanded view of deterrence outcomes reveals two forms of deterrence failure, one violent and the other peaceful. Most important, it includes compromise, which allows for a mixture of gains and losses to both sides. Although not a rare event, compromise is often overlooked since it escapes the dichotomized distinction between success and failure. This analysis demonstrates that the exclusion of compromise ensures a high probability of measurement error with important analytical consequences.
The final issue involves the problems created by the possibility for states to "select themselves" into conflicts according to their prior beliefs about how their opponent is most likely to behave. If this is the case, it becomes difficult to treat deterrence cases as a random sample. Several recent models acknowledge this problem explicitly by taking into account the "self-selection" effects (e.g., Fearon 1994a Fearon , 1994b Smith 1996 Smith , 1998 . The development of such models has led to the reformulation of theoretical expectations about the effects of several variables, including the relative power and alliances, on deterrence outcomes. On the basis of these models, I derive hypotheses and then test them using the new deterrence data set and find some important new results.
The empirical results indicate that in extended deterrence, alliance ties between a defender and its pawn are more reliable and a more effective deterrent than previously thought. Relative power also is found to make a difference, even in immediate deterrence, a result that is not expected in the literature on selection effects. On the other hand, the findings do support the expectations from this literature that a more powerful actor is less likely to acquiesce to its opponent's demands. Although the arguments about selection biases are not yet precise concerning the effects of power parity on deterrence outcomes, I explore this issue as well. The test strongly demonstrates that relatively equal adversaries are more likely to achieve a compromise. This finding sheds new light on the debate about the likelihood of war under the balance or imbalance of power. Moreover, it shows the importance of including compromise in the analysis of deterrence because it is strongly associated with the balance of power.
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND DETERRENCE DEFINITION AND TYPES OF DETERRENCE
Deterrence refers to a situation in which one side (i.e., deterrer) threatens to retaliate if the other side takes some action unacceptable to the deterrer. The major function of deterrence is to prevent some action from happening. In the military context, its most common purpose is to prevent an adversary from using force.
Most quantitative studies of deterrence follow Morgan's (1983, 30 ) distinction between general and immediate deterrence:
Immediate deterrence concerns the relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it. General deterrence relates to opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack.
The distinction is quite intuitive, although it is apparent that it can be difficult, according to this definition, to distinguish an arms race, for instance, from the "cases" of general deterrence. Another widely used classification, relevant especially for major power relations, makes the distinction between direct and extended deterrence. Basic or direct deterrence refers to the prevention of attack on the deterrer's home territory. In extended deterrence, a state attempts to deter an attack on a third party such as its ally (e.g., Huth and Russett 1988,30; Weede 1983,234) , aprotCgC (Stein 1987,326; Wu 1990 ), apawn (Russett 1963; Zagare and Kilgour 2000) , or any other state (George and Smoke 1974,58; Lebow and Stein 1990,336) .
Although extended deterrence is a common and precarious element of major power relationships, it was not directly addressed in the literature until very recently. A series of works by Huth and Russett in particular laid the grounds for quantitative research in this area (Huth 1988; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993; Huth and Russett 1984 , 1988 Russett 1963) , and formal models of extended deterrence also expanded (Kilgour and Zagare 1994; Wu 1990; Zagare and Kilgour 2000) . The relevance of extended deterrence for major power relations is indicated in a recent attempt to record all deterrence encounters among great powers from 1816 through 1984: 65% of these encounters were cases of extended deterrence, and 35% represented direct deterrence encounters (Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993, 
BASIC DETERRENCE STAGES AND DECISION STRUCTURE
To clarify the distinction between different types and stages of deterrence, Figure 1 outlines the sequence of events that distinguishes general from immediate deterrence. Figure 1is helpful in clarifying which decision choices precede general or immediate deterrence and which decisions indicate the failure of either type of deterrence. Most scholars subscribe to the view that any overt or less explicit form of competition for influence between two or more powers, such as maintaining armed forces, can be interpreted as a case of general deterrence (Morgan 1983, 30) . Figure 1 , however, points to a more restrictive and reliable approach for identifying general deterrence cases. It indicates that general deterrence is triggered only if at least one side makes a certain threat either through direct official statements or any other behavior commonly understood to imply a threat, such as substantial movement of troops or putting armed forces on high alert. If there is no such verbal or behavioral form of a threat, then the situation of, for example, an intensified maintenance of armed forces should be more correctly interpreted as an arms race, which might have different underlying dynamics than deterrence encounters. Figure 1 identifies deterrence success only to draw an analytical distinction between successes and failures, although empirical identification of deterrence success can be problematic. Deterrence failure occurs when any other party challenges the deterrer's original threat; as a simple generic definition, it applies to both general and immediate deterrence. As Figure 1 shows, the failure of general deterrence does not necessarily lead to the stage of immediate deterrence, a point that was often overlooked in previous empirical studies. In large part, this oversight is related to the requirement for a challenger's intention to attack as a trigger for the onset of immediate deterrenceand the defender's commitment to react. Although widespread, this requirement is problematic.
The obvious empirical problem is in establishing a challenger's intention to retaliate. As any other motivational or cognitive construct, intentions escape a replicable empirical identification.' Furthermore, it is important to specify whether the defender's commitment to defend the pawn precedes or follows the challenger's threat of attack. As indicated in Figure 1 ,it is important to recognize that once general deterrence fails, immediate deterrence does not automatically start unless the defender reacts to the challenge to its general deterring threat. Any prior defender's threat against such a challenge belongs to the dynamics of general deterrence. If this prior threat is also considered as a definitional requirement for immediate deterrence, then the line between general and immediate dynamics of deterrence is blurred. To remove any possible confusion in this respect, a revised and more precise delineation of immediate deterrence is accordingly illustrated in Figure 1 . This clarification should, therefore, provide better conceptual guidance for a more robust and replicable identification of historical cases of deterrence encounters.
I define deterrence as a situation in which one side threatens the other side with some punitive retaliation if the other side takes certain action. In direct deterrence, this undesired action is aimed at the territory of the deterrer, whereas in extended deterrence, it is aimed against a third party. I focus on the immediate type of extended deterrence, which occurs when general deterrence fails and a defender threatens to retaliate against the challenge (see Figure 1 ).In the extended form of immediate deterrence, the challenger's threat and defender's responses are related to a third party.
1. This was one of the core issues in the debate between two m u p s of deterrence scholars, one using a quantitative analysis of deterrence (Huth 1988; Huth and ~ussett-1984 Huth and ~ussett- , 1988 Huth and ~ussett- , 1990 Russen 1963 ) and the other advocating comvarative case studies (Lebow 1981 ; Stein 1987.1990 ). Although both sides acknowledged the difficulties in establishing intentions, the debate did not lead either side toquestion the definition of deterrence based on intentions. Rather, the difference remained in that Lebow and Stein attempted to historically document if such intentions existed at all, whereas Huth and Russen inferred them from behavior. The resulting "alarmingly low levels of cross-study reliability" (Lebow and Stein 1990,340 ) between these two groups of studies should not then come as a surprise.
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DETERRENCE OUTCOMES: SUCCESS, FAILURE, OR SOMETHING ELSE?
Figure 1 identifies deterrence success only to draw an analytical distinction between successes and failures, although an empirical identification of deterrence successes can be problematic. A potential attacker's restraint from using force because of the deterrer's threats is commonly defined to constitute deterrence success (e.g., Huth and Russett 1984, 497; Lebow and Stein 1987, 24) . In other words, the term deterrence success in this definition implies that the absence of war should be attributed to the effectiveness of threats. Precisely for this reason, however, it is difficult to determine cases of deterrence success: peaceful resolutions of disputes may result from many conditions despite a deterrent threat. Moreover, the absence of a challenge should not necessarily be interpreted as a deterrence success; a potential challenger might restrain itself from upsetting the status quo for many reasons, not all of which need to be related to a deterrent threat (George and Smoke 1989, 178) . For instance, the putative challenger may already be satisfied with the status quo regarding the prospective target. Kissinger's (1994) opening quote astutely acknowledges how it can be misleading to attribute the absence of war to the deployment of a particular deterrent strategy. Only if an analyst controls for all possible conditions except for the deterrer's threats, a quite impossible endeavor, may we say that a would-be attacker did not use force because of the deterrer's threats. In addition, the analyst has to demonstrate that the would-be attacker indeed intended to use force in the first place. Whereas the first requirement is impossible to achieve and the second is mostly speculative, it is questionable whether deterrence success can ever be validly tested. ' Some empirical analysts acknowledge this important analytical issue (e.g., Huth and Russett 1984,497) , although many others, despite its methodological relevance, continue to label peaceful resolutions of deterrence cases as deterrence success. This study introduces a new classification of deterrence outcomes to rectify some intrinsic flaws in the dichotomized success-failure approach. If a general deterrence failure enters the immediate stage-that is, if the defender demands the challenger back away from its threatened or actual attack vis-h-vis a third party-then there are four possible outcomes: either challenger or defender can acquiesce to the other's demands (AcqCh or AcqDef), they can reach some sort of compromise, or, if neither is willing to concede, a crisis escalates into war.3
The advantage of this treatment of deterrence outcomes over a simple dichotomy of success or failure is twofold. First, though some might argue that the defender's acquiescence or war can be viewed as deterrence failure and the challenger's acquiescence as its success, compromise, as a midpoint between success and failure, escapes this 2. Notwithstanding these problems in establishing a deterrence success empirically, see Harvey (1998) for a comprehensive and useful theoretical discussion of the necessary and sufficient conditions for deterrence success and failure.
3. Because these four outcomes are not germane for the distinction between general and immediate deterrence, they are not presented in Figure 1. dichotomy. Consequently, it is important to include the possibility for an outcome that does not present a clear-cut success or failure for either side.4
Second, it is common for the dichotomized approach to deterrence outcomes to identify deterrence failure with the use of force and deterrence success with a peaceful outcome. The classification of four outcomes reveals why such an approach can be misleading. Although war undoubtedly represents deterrence failure, peaceful outcomes imply three possibilities in terms of perceived successes: a deterrer's perceived success if the challenger peacefully acquiesces (AcqCh), the challenger's success if the deterrer acquiesces without fighting (AcqDef), or both might compromise. These three peaceful outcomes carry different political implications for either side in terms of winning or losing the conflict, which are all conflated in the single notion of deterrence success as a peaceful o~t c o m e .~
THE IMPACT OF SELECTION EFFECTS:
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
THE PROBLEM OF SELECTION BIAS
Another problem in empirical deterrence studies concerns the issue of selection effects: states "select or do not select themselves" into foreign disputes depending on their prior beliefs about the likely behavior of their opponents if the dispute occurs. One consequence of this "self-selection" is that "hypotheses that are true for general deterrence may be exactly reversed for immediate deterrence" (Fearon 1994a, 245) . For this reason, recent theoretical research on selection effects (Bueno de Mesquita 1990; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Fearon 1994a Fearon , 1994b Morrow 1989; Smith 1996 Smith , 1998 have developed new assumptions about deterrence behavior that challenge some of the premises of previous conventional approaches to deterrence. For example, if the challenger believes that the defender prefers to fight over its pawn rather than to concede or compromise, then general deterrence is likely to succeed. On the other hand, if general deterrence does fail, it indicates a determined challenger who would be willing to fight even against a more powerful defender. The immediate deterrence is thus more likely to fail (Fearon 1994a ).
4. Perhaps for this reason, compromise as an outcome was completely bypassed in many previous studies with rare exceptions such as Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's (1992) study of militarized disputes that included the possibility for "negotiation" as an outcome.
5. A stalemate is another type of outcome that needs to be included in future refinements. Like compromise, it has often been neglected in empirical analyses. Exceptions include Huth and Russett (1988) . who incorporate stalemate as one of their three outcomes of extended-immediate deterrence, but they bypass the possibility of compromise. The Manchurian evacuation crisis of 1903, for instance, belongs to such a case, although its outcome is coded in the present analysis as the Japanese acquiescence. This coding is correct in the short run, but in the long run, the crisis was a prelude to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and hence it can be interpreted as a stalemate. At this stage, a stalemate is not included as an option in the present analysis, but it is a part of the agenda for future research.
Consequently, Fearon (1994a) extensively reevaluates the findings from the quantitative deterrence literature in the context of his theoretical arguments about selection effects. As an illustration, he explains the results of Huth's study (1988) , in which the ex ante measures of the defender's interests did not have a statistically significant impact on the probability of immediate deterrence success. Fearon does not find such results surprising because they validate the logic of the argument about selection bias. That is, similar to relative capabilities, it is argued that "ex ante measures of the defender's commitment to the protege should be related to general deterrence success, but immediate deterrence failure" (Fearon 1994a, 258) .
On the other hand, Huth's interpretation suggests that the assumption about the negative correlation between the ex ante observable indicators of deterrence credibility and the immediate deterrence success might be too restrictive.' Specifically, Huth offers an alternative argument that the direction and strength of such a correlation depend on how strong the relationship is between the unobservable variable of the challenger's motivation and the ex ante measures of the defender's interests. If the defender's motivation is stronger than that of the challenger, even assuming that both sides have relatively high stakes in the crisis, the correlation between the defender's interests and immediate deterrence success is likely to be positive, as originally expected by Huth and Russett (1984) and Huth (1988) . However, if the challenger is more motivated than the defender, this positive correlation is more likely to be attenuated. It can even be reversed into a negative correlation, as expected in the models of selection effects, if the difference between the challenger's and the defender's interests widens to the challenger's advantage. In other words, Huth argues that the statistical control of selection effects could, but not necessarily would, reverse the positive correlation coefficients, which are conventionally expected. In this logic, accordingly, it is easier to interpret the apparently inconsistent findings about the effects of the defender's interests on deterrence outcomes.' Moreover, according to Huth, the impact of the observable ex ante indicators of the defender's interests on the challenger's motivation can vary across different indicators, thus explaining the previous results that showed only some of the interest variables to have strong effects on deterrence (Huth 1988) . ' With a few notable exceptions, the newly emerged studies on selection effects have not been systematically tested.' I will concentrate on the impact of relative power and alliances on deterrence outcomes because these two factors are standard in most deterrence studies and have been widely discussed in the literature on selection effects. To address the issues of selection bias, I base my hypotheses on the models that include the selection effects of prior beliefs as an endogenous variable and then deduce hypotheses about likely outcomes given selection bias." In part, the results could also provide a testing ground for assessing the analytical logic advanced by Huth (as outlined above), which reinterprets-although does not necessarily contradict-the theoretical arguments about selection bias.
I look at relative power and alliances as the principal explanatory variables since they are commonly tested in the deterrence literature, and they are the focus of recent research on selection effects as well. Because previous studies of selection effects treated the outcomes only as deterrence success or failure, they have little to say so far about the probability of compromise. My empirical analysis is thus exploratory for the often neglected compromise outcome, and the empirical results could be informative for future research. The logic of hypothesized correlations, however, is directly derived from the recent models of selection bias (Fearon 1994a (Fearon , 1994b Morrow 1989; Smith 1996 Smith , 1998 .
The hypotheses that we find in the literature on selection effects about the impact of relative power on deterrence outcomes are not significantly different from those in the quantitative deterrence research. Their theoretical rationale, however, is quite different from the conventional logic of deterrence studies.
Hypothesis la: If long-term relative capabilities favor the challenger, immediate deterrence is likely to fail and lead to war. The failure will lead to the defender's acquiescence without fighting only if the challenger's power is vastly superior to that of defender. Hypothesis Ib: If long-ten relative capabilities favor thedefender, the challenger is likely to acquiesce to the defender's demands without fighting.
One of the arguments in the studies of selection effects is that relative power is strongly related to the onset of immediate deterrence but is generally weakly related to the outcome of immediate deterrence (Fearon 1994a (Fearon , 1994b Morrow 1989) . Namely, it is unlikely for a weaker challenger to initiate conflict, but if it does, then some other factors play a larger role than relative power. These factors could be related to the challenger's dissatisfaction with the status quo or to its belief that the defender has weak stakes or interests in the dispute. Consequently, we can find a number of consistent hypotheses in the selection effects literature about the impact of relative power on deterrence outcomes, as summarized in hypotheses l a and l b (for sources, see Fearon 1994a; Morrow 1989) . Similar hypotheses can be found in the quantitative deterrence literature. Empirical findings vary from those that show no significant correlation between relative power and deterrence outcomes (Huth and Russett 1984) to those that strongly confirm these hypotheses (Huth 1988; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993) .
10.An alternative approach would be to use a specific testing procedure that accounts for selection bias instead of employing and examining the theoretical model that includes selection bias as an endogenous variable. To control for selection bias in the former sense, several studies used statistical methods such as the strategically censored discrete-choice model developed by Smith (1999) , a model based on logit quantal response equilibrium (Signorino 1999 ) and censored probit analysis (Reed 2000) .
It is interesting that so far, the literature concerned with selection bias has not produced explicit predictions of deterrence outcomes under power parity. Morrow (1989, 957) , however, deduced from his model that the probability of escalation to war was highest when the distribution of power shifted in the challenger's favor. This theoretical expectation is consistent with some empirical results of quantitative tests of deterrence outcomes (Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993) . One of the recent empirical tests, which controls for selection effects, further indicates that power parity tends to decrease the probability of immediate deterrence failure and subsequent escalation to war (Reed 2000) . Similarly, my test examines deterrence outcomes under power parity conditions to facilitate further comparisons with previous findings.
Note that hypotheses l a and l b specify long-term capabilities, as distinct from a short-term force, to incorporate the insights from previous research that highlight important differences among long-term, short-term, and immediate capabilities (Huth 1988) . Generally, potential attackers were found to resort to the large-scale use of force to achieve their objectives, even if the conflict starts and terminates as a low-cost military operation. Since the National Capabilities Index, as developed by the Correlates of War (COW) project, is often identified as an indicator of long-term capabilities (Huth 1988; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993; Huth and Russett 1984) , it is used as an indicator of power in this analysis too.
Another set of hypotheses relates alliance ties between the defender and the pawn to deterrence outcomes. In this respect, theoretical expectations are divergent if we compare the literature concerned with selection effects and the quantitative analysis of deterrence.
Hypothesis 2a:
If an effort at immediate deterrence occurs, it is likely to fail if there is an alliance between the defender and the pawn. Hypothesis 2b: The failure of immediate deterrence is likely to result in war if the alliance ties between the defender and the pawn are strong.
If the defender is allied to the pawn, then we should intuitively expect immediate deterrence to succeed. Yet the empirical results do not always support this expectation (Huth 1988; Huth and Russett 1984) . The literature on selection effects attempts to offer a theoretical solution to this puzzle. First, the challenger is less likely to initiate conflict against allied nations than against nonallied nations (e.g., Smith 1998,333) . If the challenger eventually does decide to "select" itself into the conflict against the pawn (general deterrence thus failed), it indicates that the alliance ties between the defender and the pawn were not an effective deterrent. As a result, we should expect immediate deterrence to fail as well (Fearon 1994a, 246 ; see also Smith 1996 Smith ,1998 .
Furthermore, immediate deterrence is less likely to be triggered if the alliance is reliable (Smith 1998,324-25) . If the challenge still occurs, then the probability of the defender's willingness to fight for its pawn increases with the stronger reliability of their alliance ties (Smith 1995 (Smith ,1996 (Smith ,1998 . We can infer the reliability of alliances ex post, that is, from the actual outcomes of deterrence, but this measure of alliance reli-ability produces sampling bias (Smith 1995) .11 For this reason, Smith (1996) suggests that we should use alternative measures such as the duration of alliances with the assumption that alliances become less reliable as they age. Alternatively, we can use the type of alliance as a proxy measure for alliance reliability and assume that the reliability is higher if the alliance moves from weaker types such as ententes to stronger ties such as defensive pacts. I use this latter measure to test the hypothesis about the effect of alliance reliability.''
RESEARCH DESIGN EXTENDED-IMMEDIATE DETERRENCE: MEASUREMENTS AND DATA
As already pointed out, the extended type of immediate deterrence between major powers is the most frequent and precarious aspect of major power relations. As it is also the most examined type of deterrence in quantitative studies, this analysis should be viewed as a part of the cumulation of knowledge in this area. In their search for more robust and rigorous ways to measure and test deterrence arguments, a number of previous analyses made remarkable contributions. Theoretical arguments on deterrence have been tested in both qualitative and quantitative research. Among those who use qualitative methods, comparative case studies figure prominently (Betts 1987; George and Smoke 1974; Lebow 1981; Mearsheimer 1983; Organski and Kugler 1980; Snyder and Diesing 1977) , although there were some theoretically significant single case studies as well (Russett 1967; . On the quantitative side, the pioneering work by Russett (1963) was followed by a series of studies on extended deterrence in the 1980s and later (Huth 1988; Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett 1993; Huth and Russett 1984 , 1988 Weede 1983; Wu 1990 ). Regardless of the method, therefore, extended-immediate deterrence gets much scholarly attention.
Operational rules. Partly to address several conceptual weaknesses and partly to guide a more robust and replicable empirical analysis, the operational criteria for selecting the cases of extended-immediate deterrence will be consistent with the rules set out in the previous conceptual section. The cases include all instances in which (1) at least one major power (challenger) upsets the status quo in general deterrence vis-i-vis another major power (defender) by getting into a conflict with the third state (pawn), and (2) the defender demands the challenger pull out from the conflict against the pawn. The first stage constitutes general deterrence failure as a necessary but not 11. Smith's rationale is that alliances are created for one purpose, but as they become older, they are less likely to find themselves in the same situations for which they were designed, and their reliability might consequently change in the new circumstances (Smith 1996.27) .
12. This approach is consistent with Bueno de Mesquita's (1981) presentation of alliance types on the ordinal scale. My test examines whether his approach is justified despite some later criticism that questioned the validity of ordinal measures for alliance types. sufficient condition for having immediate deterrence, whereas the second stage marks the onset of immediate deterrence between the powers in their extended deterrent encounter. The focus here is only on those types ofcrises and deterrence in which only military means are used by either power. Consequently, the essential moves marking general deterrence failure and the beginning of immediate deterrence are operationally defined in terms of military moves. Because deterrent threats can be manifested both verbally and behaviorally as discussed above, the range of such moves includes the following:I3 (1) a threat of force (including the threat to blockade, occupy territory, declare war, or use force), (2) display of force (alert, mobilization, or show of force), and (3) use of force (blockade, occupation, seizure, limited use of force, or war).14 I do not explain deterrence success or failure because of the problems already discussed. Rather, I differentiate four possible outcomes of extended-immediate deterrence: (1) the challenger's acquiescence to the defender's demands to pull out from the conflict against the third party (AcqCh), (2) the defender's acquiescence to the challenger's perseverance in its conflict against the defender's pawn (AcqDef), (3) a compromise between challenger and defender in which each side achieves some goals while yielding on some other issues without any use of force (compromise), and (4) a war in which challenger and defender use force against each other as a means of resolving the dispute (war). The operational rules for identifying deterrence outcomes are therefore based on a combination of two factors: the extent to which each side's demands are met and the degree of escalation in the use of force. The next step is to identify major powers because the dynamics of their deterrence behavior is of primary concern here. To facilitate the comparison with the list of deterrence cases compiled by Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993) RussiaIUSSR (1895 RussiaIUSSR ( -1985 , China (1950 China ( -1985 , Japan (1 895-1 943, and the United States of America (1899 America ( -1985 13.This typology of military acts is based on the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Disputes Project (see Gochmk and Maoz 1984) . The typology is consistent with the conceptual definition of deterrence in behavioral terms as formulated here. Most other deterrence studies have similarly used the COW operational classification to capture diverse forms of deterrence manifestation (e.g., ~uth1988; Huth, Gelpi and Bennett 1993). even though their conceptual premise of deterrence was formulated in terms of the actors' intentions.
14. It is important to identify the types of actions that are excluded from the analysis. They include the following actions: (I) joint military actions by several major powers against another state, while no other major power seriously objects to this collective action (e.g., the joint intervention against Greece in the Cretan insurrection of 1897 or the 1900-1901 joint intervention against the Boxer Rebellion in China);
(2)accidental and relatively quickly clarified incidents (e.g., the 1904DoggerBankepisode. the 1937 Panay incident, and a number of such incidents during the cold war such as the 1969 EC-121 spy plane incident); (3) a major power's action within its own territory (e.g., its own civil war, such as the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia) or that of its colony; (4) a covert involvement that was not officially endorsed by the major power's government (e.g., the 1984 mining of Nicaraguan po~ts with the help of the CIA); and (5)increased military assistance during the time of conflict (this was a frequent resort of superpowers during the cold war period-unless accompanied by any military act as identified above, it cannot be considered a deterrent case but rather a case of intensified arms transfer).
15.The only difference between Singer and Small's (1982) standard list of major powers and that of Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993) is in Singer and Small's inclusion of France and Great Britain for the post-World War I1 period. The disagreement over these two countries as major powers for the cold war Danilovic/ISSUESIN DETERRENCE I09 Data set. Following these operational rules, we can determine the universe of extended-immediate deterrence encounters between major powers for the period from 1895 to 1985. Their list is presented in the Appendix A, which identifies challenger, defender, pawn, outcomes, and conventional names for conflicts as commonly used in historical surveys. 16 Appendix B provides a brief comparison between the list developed in this study and those of Huth and Russett (1990) and Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1 993). The studies by Huth and others are compared to this work in terms of their inclusion or exclusion of historical cases listed in Appendix A. Appendix B also includes the comparison of the assigned roles for challengers and defenders. It would not be appropriate to provide the comparison of outcomes as Huth and Russett (1990) and Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993) present them as deterrence success or failure, whereas I am interested in the settlement of the crisis, including the possibility of compromise (neither success nor failure).
Despite some degree of overlap between the lists of cases, there are some significant differences among all three studies. First, the earlier set developed by Huth and Russett (1990) included fewer cases of deterrence encounters than the data set introduced here or that of Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993) . About 20 cases included in this study are not found in Huth and Russett's list, whereas 4 cases from their set are ruled out as cases of extended-immediate deterrence here. On the other hand, Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993) list 17 cases of extended deterrence that are not found in the present analysis, but they omit 13 cases that can be found here. The difference in determining the defenders and the challengers is relatively small: out of 26 commonly identified cases in my list and that developed by Huth and Russett, only 20% have reversed roles for defenders and challengers; the difference is even smaller in comparison to the list provided by Huth, Gelpi, and Bennett (1993) .
Major differences between this list of extended-immediate deterrence cases and the previous ones result from several factors, both conceptual and empirical. The operational rules for identifying the cases are guided here by the conceptual distinction between general deterrence failure and the onset of immediate deterrence as presented in Figure 1 . This clarification resulted in identifying several cases as general deterrence failures but not as immediate deterrence cases as well. Furthermore, at the conceptual level, I do not specify deterrence in terms of actors' intentions but strictly behaviorally to avoid, among other things, the problem of reliability in identifying period extends from analysts to policy makers as well. In his conversation with AbbaEban in May 1967, for instance, Lyndon B. Johnson was reportedly puzzled over the same question and reacted in his proverbially spontaneous manner. After Eban had told him about De Gaulle's opinion that the four great powers should concert their action, Johnson was bewildered: "The Four Great Powers? Who the hell are the other two?" (Eban 1992, 279 ). An additional test has been conducted with France and Great Britain included for the post-1945 period, and their inclusion does not significantly alter any of the empirical results presented here. This slightly expanded analysis is available on request.
16. Conventional historical names given to particular crises are listed in the appendices to facilitate the identification of each case for readers. Brief historical summaries of all listed cases are available on request. The lists of direct deterrence encounters between major powers and their general deterrence failures that did not escalate into immediate deterrence from 1895 to 1985 are also available on request.
intentions. Finally, the number of historical sources consulted for this data set is more comprehensive than the sources reported in previous studies of deterrence (e.g., Huth 1988, 26-27; Huth and Russett 1984, 504-5) . This reanalysis of historical materials explains many differences in the coding of a number of historical cases (for a selected list of consulted historical surveys, see the sources listed in Appendix A).''
Coding values and statistical model. The dependent variable can be interpreted as a discrete or ordinal categorical variable because it consists of four categories, each corresponding to one of four deterrence outcomes (AcqDef, AcqCh, compromise, war). As an ordinal variable, it requires the selection of an adequate criterion for ranking the deterrence outcomes from low to high on an ordered scale. If the degree of a disputant's resolve, say the challenger's, is selected as the measure for ordering the outcomes, then the ordered values that range from low (0) to high (3) reflect an increasing degree of the challenger's resolve. It is fairly easy to group AcqCh and compromise at the lower end of such a scale because both outcomes indicate a less resolved challenger, although clearly with a relatively stronger resolve if the compromise is reached. However, the rank order between AcqDef and war can be disputed because it is a function of both the challenger's and the defender's resolve.
For instance, a highly resolute challenger can face an equally resolute defender, in which case war is assigned the highest ordinal value (i.e., AcqCh =0, compromise = 1, AcqDef = 2, war = 3). Alternatively, a highly resolute challenger can face a less resolved defender, in which case AcqDef is assigned the highest ordinal value (i.e., AcqCh =0, compromise = 1,war =2, AcqDef = 3). In the analysis, I estimate the models based on both ordinal scales for coding the dependent variable and present the results for each model. Ordered probit analysis is used for estimation, which is a standard choice for examining the dependent variable of this type.'' In an ordered probit analysis, the P coefficients are not equal to the marginal effects of independent variables on the outcome probabilities. For this reason, additional calculations are required to estimate the direction and substantive significance of obtained correlations. As was done in a number of other quantitative studies of deterrence, I use the marginal impact analysis to assess the magnitude of correlations. Specifically, using this approach, we can estimate the change in probability of each deterrence outcome associated with a change in an independent variable, while holding other variables at their mean or modal values.
17.Whenever general historical surveys lacked sufficiently detailed information on particular crises, I consulted a number of historical monographs about the specific crises. Appendix A refers to a selection of historical surveys; the full list of consulted sources is available on request.
18. If the deterrence outcomes were measured as a discrete variable, a few statistical models would be available for selection, but multinomial logit analysis is the most frequent choice. Yet the multinomial logit model could be oroblematic since it is characterized by the independence of irrelevant alternatives property (IIA), and the I~A assumption might be violated in thk contextof foreign policy choices. For more details about ordered probit, multinomial logit, and other models for qualitative dependent variables, see. Greene (2000) and Maddala (1983) . LIMDEP 7.0 was used to estimate the models in this analysis.
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EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
To examine the impact of the challenger's and defender's relative capabilities and their alliance ties with a third party on the probability of each of the four outcomes, the explanatory variables are operationalized as follows:
(1) Relative capabilities reflect a major power's strength relative to that of another power. It is common to calculate it as the ratio of one nation's capability (e.g., the defender's) to the sum of the capabilities of both disputants (i.e., the defender's and challenger's capabilities). The value ranges from 0 (defender's absolute power inferiority) to 1 (defender's absolute power superiority), with the exact midpoint (0.5) indicating power parity between the two sides. Data on power capabilities are obtained from the COW National Capabilities data set.
Although quite often used, this measure does not help us directly evaluate whether parity or disparity is correlated with another variable.'' Because an exact balance of forces is at midpoint value, the significance and direction of correlation might be sensitive only to the situations other than parity (i.e., if the value is closer to 0 or 1, and both situations represent power ineq~ality).~" Probit analysis should help circumvent the problem. Since we can use probit estimators to compute marginal effects of changes in independent variables on the probabilities of deterrence outcomes, we can easily assess the impact of power balance on deterrence by changing the values of relative power from disparity to symmetric balance or vice versa.
(2)The strength of a major power's ties with the third party is important for examining the effect of the defender's commitment to the pawn in protecting it against another major power. Despite several indicators for such ties (foreign trade, arms sales, etc.), their most visible and theoretically important form is manifested through alliances. Following Small and Singer (1969) , alliances can be classified and coded in the ascending order of their strength as ententes (0), neutrality pacts (I), and defense pacts (2). If a country was considered officially independent at the time of the conflict but nevertheless had a semicolonial status in its relations with at least one major power, this semicolonial aspect of their relations was added as the fourth and highest category (coded 3)''
A simple dichotomous measure of alliances, indicating the absence (coded 0) or presence (coded 1) of an alliance between the defender and its pawn, would suffice for the purpose of testing hypothesis 2a. Hypothesis 2b specifies the correlation between 19. As already mentioned, the selection effects literature is not yet precise about the expected relationship between power parity and deterrence outcomes. I therefore analyze this relationship only for exploratory purposes.
20. An anonymous reviewer suggested a valuable insight that we can relax this restriction by specifying the model to include both the measure of relative power and its squared value. Such a specification would allow for the inclusion of reverse patterns without constraining the balance of power at the midpoint value. I estimated models with the squared term, but the results were not statistically significant. For this reason, I opt for an alternative method, which is better suited for this data set.
21. Data on alliances have been taken from Small and Singer (1969) for the period from 1895 to 1965 and from Oren (1990) for their 1965 to 1980 update. The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (1998) and Townsend's (1941) comprehensive survey were primary sources for collecting information on the additional (fourth) category of semicolonial ties. alliance reliability and deterrence outcomes. To test it, the ordinal scale of alliance types, as outlined above, is used as a proxy measure for alliance reliability.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A brief descriptive survey of deterrence outcomes (see Table 1 ) indicates 60 cases of deterrence dyads." Close to one-half of the cases resulted in the challenger's peaceful acquiescence to the defender's demands, but more than 35% of the cases led to deterrence failure, and the remaining 16.7% were resolved through compromise. Almost one-half of the deterrence failures escalated to war.
The results of the ordered probit estimation are presented in Table 2 . They show that power distribution and alliance ties are statistically significant predictors of behavior. The overall explanatory power of both models is also strong (chi-square is significant at a very high level for a sample of 60 cases). The threshold parameters in both models are significant, which justifies the use of two different orderings of the dependent variable.23 The difference, however, is not reflected in the reversed direction of correlations in these two models but only in the attenuated magnitude of the effects obtained in model 2. Because the log-likelihood function for model 1 is also higher than that for model 2, it can be safely concluded that model 1 generally fits better the observed data in this analysis." To evaluate the substantive significance of the correlations (see Table 3 ), I subsequently concentrate on the results obtained from this model.
Both hypotheses la and lb are mostly supported in the test. In general, the hypotheses predict that the coefficient for the defender's relative capability will be negative.
22. There were 46 cases of extended-immediate deterrence between major powers in the observed period . Some of these cases had more than one challenger, defender, or pawn, which resulted in the total of 60 cases of deterrence dyads as the unit of analysis of the empirical test.
23. The threshold parameter pkrefers to the divisions between the categories of the dependent variable.
As the first threshold is always set to 0, pl separates compromise from the defender's acquiescence, and pz separates the defender's acquiescence from war. A statistical significance of the thresholds indicates how much the ordering arrangement of the categories of the dependent variable truly matters in the analysis. 24. To examine the validity of this inference, I also used Akaike's information criterion (AIC) as a popular measure of information for assessing the fit of a model. The model with the smaller AIC is considered the better fitting model, and again, model 1 showed a better fit. Table 2 demonstrates that both the direction and statistical significance of correlation between relative capabilities and deterrence outcomes strongly support such predictions. As already specified, higher values of the measure for relative capabilities indicate a power disparity to the defender's advantage, and the lower values indicate the challenger's relative superiority. Also, the four types of deterrence outcomes are arranged in an ascending order from the challenger's acquiescence (conventionally interpreted as a deterrence success) to the outcomes indicating the immediate deterrence failure. The negative and significant parameter for relative capabilities demon-strates that the challenger is likely to acquiesce if facing the stronger defender (hypothesis 1 b), and the immediate deterrence failure is likely to occur if the balance of power favors the challenger (hypothesis la).
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To examine the substantive significance of the correlation between relative capabilities and deterrence outcomes, the analysis of marginal impact is reported in Table 3 . It is clear that the shift of power distribution from the defender's superiority (e.g., 3: 1 power ratio) to the same ratio of power imbalance but now to the challenger's advantage (e.g., 1:3 ratio) decreases the probability of the challenger's acquiescence by 63.9% and increases the probability of immediate deterrence failure (i.e., defender's acquiescence or war). Under this condition, the likelihood of war increases by 43.5%, and the probability for a peaceful failure through the defender's acquiescence increases by 20%.
The support for hypothesis 1 a is only moderate: Table 3 reveals that deterrence failure is likely to lead to war only under the conditions of a largely superior challenger (see also Morrow 1989) . For example, the shift from an equal balance of power to a two-to-one advantage for the challenger increases the probability of war by 29.1%. The probability of war increases by an even higher percentage change (43.5%) if the shift occurs from a power parity to a three-to-one advantage for the challenger. In this respect, hypothesis la is only partly supported.
It is interesting to note that there is a clear curvilinear relationship between the distribution of power and the probability of compromise. Table 3 demonstrates that the probability of compromise is increased only under the balance of power. For example, a change in the balance of power from a three-to-one advantage for the defender to an equal balance increases the probability of compromise by 7.3%. On the other hand, the change from an equal balance of power to a one-to-three disadvantage for the defender decreases the likelihood of compromise by 6.8%. It does not seem to matter if the imbalance of power reflects the defender's or challenger's superiority-in either case, compromise is less likely. As reported in Table 3 , a shift from the defender's power superiority to the challenger's superiority, or vice versa, does not significantly affect the probability of compromise (i.e., the percentage change in the likelihood of compromise is close to zero).
Empirical findings about the impact of alliances on deterrence outcomes are statistically significant as well, but they do not generally support theoretical expectations from the models of selection effects (i.e., hypotheses 2a and 2b). The coefficient for the alliance variable is statistically significant (Table 2) , which is consistent with the argument that one of the effects of the challenger's self-selection is that alliances do matter (Smith 1998) .25 On the other hand, the sign of this coefficient is not consistent with the predictions resulting from the extensions of this argument (Fearon 1994a; Smith 1998) , as also formulated in hypothesis 2a.
25. A statistical significance of the alliance coefficient is not consistent with some previous findings in the quantitative studies of deterrence. Huth and Russett (1988) . for example, found no significant relation between alliances and deterrence outcomes, although in their earlier study, the results showed that the defender was likely to fight over its ally (Huth and Russett 1984) .
Namely, according to hypothesis 2a, we should expect the positive coefficient for the alliance variable as it predicts the immediate deterrence failure if there is an alliance between the defender and its pawn. The rationale for this prediction is that the challenger must be highly motivated if it decides to "select" itself into the crisis against the defender's ally. Contrary to this prediction, the obtained negative correlation between alliance ties and deterrence outcomes suggests that the outcomes indicating a highly resolved challenger are less likely to occur if the defender is allied to its pawn. Table 3 gives more substantive details and reveals that changing the alliance status from none (coded 0)to the presence of an alliance between defender and pawn (coded 1) increases the probability of the challenger's acquiescence and decreases the probability of other outcomes. Because the challenger's acquiescence is the only outcome that does not represent the immediate deterrence failure, these results do not support hypothesis la. To be adequately interpreted, the results require a reinterpretation or further refinements of the argument about the implications of self-selection. Perhaps the challenger's motivation was not as strong as the defender's interests in most of the examined cases, which, according to Huth (see above), could explain the findings that are not consistent with the models of selection bias.
The results reported in Table 4 indicate a strong linear correlation between alliance types and deterrence outcomes as ordinal variables (Tau-c is statistically significant).'" Because there was no case of neutrality pacts between defenders and pawns in this data set, it is difficult to assess their role in deterrence situations. On the other hand, defense pacts and, especially, pseudo-colonial ties are much more reliable than ententes for predicting the defender's resolve to defend its pawn (see Table 4 ). This finding is reflected in the negative sign of the Tau-c measure as well. If we were to assume that the types of alliances indicate their reliability, then it is clear that the reported results do not support hypothesis 2b. Table 4 also reveals that 41 (68.3%) of the cases were without any alliance ties between the defender and the pawn, which left 19 (31.7%) cases with some type of alliance bonds. This pattern seems to indicate that the probability of immediate deterrence does not seem to be affected by previous alliance arrangements. This is consistent with Huth and Russett's (1984) finding that the challenger was likely to initiate conflicts regardless of the alliance bonds between the defender and the pawn. Regarding deterrence outcomes, however, the results reported here clearly indicate the significance of alliance bonds, along with relative capabilities, for predicting how immediate deterrence situations are likely to end.
The findings about the probability of compromise can be very informative in the absence of any previous explicit assumptions about this type of deterrence outcome. Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the probability for an extended deterrent crisis to be resolved through compromise depends largely on whether the challenger and the 26. Note that the results indicate the validity of treating alliance types as ordinal variables (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). I further examined the effect of alliance types on deterrence in a probit analysis by specifying each alliance type as a dummy variable. The pmbit estimates reiterated the tabular results; that is, the coefficient estimates for the alliance types increased with the increasing order of their strength from weaker (ententes) to stronger (defense pacts and semicolonial ties).
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' NOTE:Kendall's tau-b = -. 148* 0,< .lo, one-tailed test). N = 60 defender bargain with the same level of strength. That is, the power parity or disparity variable is statistically significant for all pairs of outcomes that include compromise as an alternative. Overall, the analysis indicates an impact of the power variable in the following way: the stronger the challenger is relative to the defender, the higher the likelihood that war will occur. On the other hand, compromise is likely to occur only under power parity. This finding shows a very high level of both statistical and substantive significance. The findings are interesting to interpret in the context of the prevailing debate on the effect of power parity on the probability of war. The new data set of extended-immediate deterrence presented here seems to lead us slightly away from this debate on the causes of war and move us toward those theories that examine the variety of peaceful resolutions of international crises.
CONCLUSION
This study addressed some key conceptual and measurement problems that have often weakened the validity of empirical research in the analysis of deterrence. I proposed a new formulation of key conceptual and operational elements in deterrence analysis. One of them clarified the problems resulting from previous ambiguities in distinguishing between general and immediate deterrence. This study also delineated a generic decision structure and stages in deterrence encounters and revised the notion of deterrence outcomes by introducing, in addition to war, three peaceful resolutions, each with different political implications for the actors.
The conceptual discussion provided more robust guidelines for identifying deterrence cases, their types, and outcomes. Based on these conceptual clarifications, I developed a new data set of extended-immediate deterrence between major powers for the period from 1895to 1985,presented it in this article, and compared it to other similar attempts.
The study also addressed a recent criticism of the selection bias in identifying deterrence cases. This bias results from the fact that nations tend to "select themselves" into crises based on their prior beliefs about the potential behavior of their opponents. To resolve this problem, the hypotheses were derived from the recent formal models that incorporated selection effects as endogenous variables.
The hypotheses were then tested in ordered probit analysis of the newly generated data set of extended-immediate deterrence between major powers from 1895 to 1985. The results generally support theoretical expectations about the impact of relative power on deterrence outcomes, but do not support all arguments from the literature on selection effects about the correlation between alliances and deterrence outcomes. The results show strongly that alliances are a more effective deterrent than usually suspected.
More important, the introduction of new outcomes, which are blurred in the traditional dichotomy of deterrence outcomes as success or failure, revealed some new and interesting patterns. The results show that compromise is more likely to be reached under power parity, whereas war is more likely to occur when the challenger is more powerful than the defender and the defender is not tied to the pawn with any alliance bonds. On the other hand, if the defender is more powerful, then the challenger is very likely to concede to the defender's demands without any use of force. Since this last case is analogous to what is termed as deterrence success, the study uncovers other important patterns that would not have been discovered if prior conceptual and operational clarifications and needed revisions had not been done.
